We explore the relationship between managerial incentives and environmental harm.
The recent passage of the Paris Agreement generated by the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference highlights a global consensus on the importance of limiting environmental harm. Businesses play a signi…cant role in environmental outcomes (Dowell, Hart, and Yeung
[2000]); many businesses are substantial contributors to the problem of climate change.
Recognizing the opportunity for business to also be part of the solution, a coalition of global companies representing over $1 trillion of revenue recently urged companies to become catalysts for reducing negative environmental impacts. 1 Meanwhile, Trucost (2013) made the provocative claim that most industries produce such a large quantity of environmental toxins that were the …rms to be …ned according to law, they would no longer be making a pro…t.
Damage caused by …rms' environmental practices-including emitting harmful greenhouse gases, polluting local air, and over-using and polluting freshwater-would have cost them $12 trillion in 2008 (Jowit, [2010] ). To answer this question more generally, we begin by constructing a simple measure that we call the pay index P . This index P captures the relative incentives of an executive in terms of upsides and downsides in potential …rm performance through equity compensation composition. We then use this index to predict both the magnitude and odds of misconduct. To validate the compensation measure beyond theory, we apply it to the settings of environmental misconduct and …nancial accounting misconduct. We …nd that changing a CEO's index P from zero (i.e., 100% of equity pay in stock) to 1 (i.e., 100% of equity pay in options) results in a CEO's …rm facing 42 65% increased odds of breaking environmental law. In addition, such change in compensation is linked to nearly a 100% increase in the magnitude of environmental harm, as measured by total government …nes.
Not only is environmental law-breaking detrimental for the environment and its adjacent communities, but mishaps can also damage …rm value. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) , Konar and Cohen (2001) , Karpo¤ et al. (2005) , Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010), Flammer (2013), and Krüger (2015) all show that when environmental concerns for a …rm are made public, the …rm su¤ers a material loss in market value. In addition to direct losses, such as regulatory penalties and civil litigation, …rms might also su¤er substantial losses due to damaged reputations. Although certain types of incentives can provide positive sustainability outcomes (e.g., see Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim [2013] , Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog [2015] , and Hong, Li, and Minor [2015] ), our …ndings suggest that conventional …nancial incentives can in ‡uence adverse environmental outcomes and may be another important channel for preserving or damaging …rm value.
To validate the index P in an entirely di¤erent setting, we explore the relationship between compensation structure and the likelihood of suspected accounting misconduct and negative earnings restatements; the …ndings for this setting are similar to those in the environmental setting. We also …nd evidence that these e¤ects come at least partially from incentive rather than selection e¤ects. Finally, we explore the consequences of two policies that could potentially ameliorate the negative e¤ects of high powered incentives.
We see this paper's contribution as three-fold. First, we construct and validate, a simple new (to the best of our knowledge) compensation index P that measures propensity for misconduct. Second, we document the e¤ects of executive compensation on the likelihood and magnitude of environmental harm. Third, we provide some policy recommendations to blunt the adverse e¤ect of executive compensation.
Theoretical Considerations
We start by constructing our index P and generating several hypotheses. In the online appendix, we formally derive P: However, here we simply provide the intuition of the measure and its predictions. We …rst motivate our theoretical considerations by example.
Misconduct is often realized in a probabilistic fashion. That is, a CEO can choose to pursue greater pro…t at the potential expense of increased harm and cost, leaving any downside to chance. For example, in the case of the BP Prudhoe Bay spill, there was a tradeo¤ for executives: they could increase pro…ts almost immediately by cutting safety expenditures, but this would increase the potential of an environmental accident. BP decided to accept the risk of this tradeo¤, which ultimately resulted in an oil spill. The government …ne alone for its Prudhoe Bay spill was $20 million, and additional costs, of course, far exceeded this amount. The primary cause of the spill was deemed to be poorly maintained pipes. This allegedly arose from BP's dogmatic adherence to cost-cutting, which was encouraged by the CEO's implementation of cost cutting incentives for top managers. With roughly 250 of BPs top managers, the CEO created an annual "contract" that was based on short-run annual pro…ts of each respective manager's division. 2 Prosecutors estimated that subsequent lax safety standards saved the …rm some $9.6 million. 3 Hence, the …rm enjoyed roughly $10 million of almost certain pro…t but faced the potential of an over $20 million cost.
The next BP CEO, Tony Hayward, was also committed to a policy of shaving costs:
almost immediately upon becoming CEO, Howard emailed associates about the importance 2 These institutional details can be found in the Fortune magazine article available here: http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/01/24/bp-an-accident-waiting-to-happen/. 3 of continued cost cutting. Once a CEO decides to risk (more) harmful outcomes-e.g., with safety cost-cutting-in exchange for greater pro…t, it may be only a matter of months until such a strategy increases the chance of an incident and its magnitude. For example, if pipelines are inspected and maintained monthly, a CEO may decide to save costs by ordering inspections on a six month basis instead, thus increasing the likelihood of malfunction which may result in costly or fatal damage. For a di¤erent example in …nancial accounting, it could be that a CEO incepts direct incentives with frontline managers to encourage aggressive …nancial accounting practices, leading to an increased chance of accounting misconduct and its magnitude.
For an entirely di¤erent setting, consider the example of dumping toxic waste. Executives can increase at least near-term pro…ts by dumping toxic waste as regular refuse, as both hazardous waste disposal fees and training costs are avoided. In this case, environmental harm is all but certain. However, as in the BP examples, the …rm's cost for misconduct occurs at some probability less than one.
More generally, this decision to accept the greater risk of harm for greater pro…t can be thought of as a CEO choosing between two strategies, one riskier than the other, but with a greater reward. The following chart illustrates these options.
For example, consider a …rm that is worth some value V 0 : The CEO can choose a safer strategy that has an upside of successfully growing the …rm to value V SS and if the strategy fails, a downside of …rm value V SF : This strategy can be thought of as the benchmark, or status quo, strategy. Alternatively, the CEO can choose a project with greater upside V RS ; but some level of downside V RF that is worse than the downside that accompanies the safer strategy.
A CEO will choose one strategy over the another as a function of her compensation incentives. For CEOs of large US public …rms, most of their compensation is in the form of equity compensation: company options and stocks. Thus, the nature of equity compensation is expected to be the biggest incentive driver of CEO decision making. In general, when a CEO is paid in the form of company stock, they become the residual claimant of her company-being equally a¤ected by both increases and decreases in …rm value-and will thus weight both potential losses and gains in deciding their course of action (Murphy [1999] and Zhang et al. [2008] ). In contrast, when a CEO is paid in the form of company stock options, she will only enjoy a …nancial return if the …rm grows in value and will experience the same …nancial return if the …rm does not change in value or loses 50% of value. 4 Therefore, a CEO will choose one strategy over another as a function of the relative "pull" of options (i.e., reach for high returns without regards to downside) versus the "pull" of stocks (i.e., balance the potential gains and losses).
In light of above, it may seem that responsible …rms should only pay their CEOs in the form of stock. However, options can be a lower cost form of compensation because the …rm only has to pay the CEO if the …rm grows in value, where with stock, the CEO is being given some value of the company whether the …rms grows or even shrinks in value. Thus, the …rm also has a tradeo¤ in how much stock versus options to o¤er the CEO. In the online appendix, we derive the optimal mix of stocks and options that the …rm will choose. We derive the following compensation pay ratio, we call index P; to measure this optimal mix:
where S is the expected value of stock paid and O is the expected value of options paid.
The greater the index P , the greater the share of equity compensation in options-which means the greater the net pull to take on the larger risk of potential downside and thus harm.
Notice that if we only measure the level of options, this would not be su¢ cient to determine the incentives for misconduct because we also need to know the degree of o¤setting force from the level of stocks. This index P captures these net forces in a simple, single metric.
Now given some index P; as shown in the online appendix, a CEO will choose some threshold of downside value V such that any potential strategy that has a lower (i.e., worse)
downside than V would never be chosen, and any strategy with higher downside (i.e., better or less harmful) than V it would be chosen. The greater the index P; the greater the pull to take on a strategy with a larger downside, since the CEO internalizes less of the downside.
This means that on average those CEOs with greater P will choose a lower threshold V :
Therefore, whenever a CEO chooses a course of action that fails, there is greater harm and cost on average. This provides our …rst hypothesis for our environmental setting.
Hypothesis 1:
The magnitude of environmental harm is increasing in index P:
Similarly, when we study …nancial accounting misconduct, we should …nd that the magnitude of misconduct is increasing in P: For this setting, the magnitude of misconduct can be measured by the amount of improperly enhanced earnings.
Hypothesis 2:
The magnitude of accounting misconduct is increasing in the index P:
The other dimension of misconduct is its likelihood of a harmful outcome. This can also be determined once we have …xed the CEO's standard of downside V : The CEO will face a variety of alternatives to the benchmark strategy, with downsides ranging from 0 to V SF :
The lower the downside standard V ; the more often a CEO will choose a strategy with a greater downside than the benchmark one. This means that on average this CEO will be engaging in more strategies that cause harm when they fail. CEOs with increased P will be choosing lower standard V : Thus, the odds of a harmful event are increasing in P: This generates our next prediction:
The odds of a harmful environmental event are increasing in P:
For the setting of …nancial accounting, the logic is the same: those with greater incentive through a larger P to enhance pro…ts at the expense of greater downside, will more often choose the potentially harmful route, which means we more often see harmful events.
Hypothesis 4:
The odds of accounting misconduct are increasing in P:
Finally, we consider some possible policies to alleviate the adverse consequences of increased P: A natural …rst policy to consider adding a "stick" or penalty against the CEO when a harmful event happens. This is in part what a law like Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to achieve: the executives become more personally accountable for negative events. However, in our setting, adding an executive penalty does not a¤ect the equilibrium risk-taking. This is because if the executive now faces a larger penalty for a harmful outcome, the …rm can simply o¤set the larger potential executive penalty with a larger P; thus retaining the …rm's original preferred level of risk-taking. As long as the executive penalty is not too severe, there should be little to no e¤ect on the odds of taking on a strategy with a potentially more harmful downside. Now we take these predictions to the data.
Empirical Analysis Executive Compensation and Environmental Harm
We use the setting of environmental harm as our primary test of executive compensation and misconduct. This environment has several desirable features for this study. First, at least for larger US …rms, environmental failures are relatively easy to capture by means of public disclosure-both in terms of incidence and magnitude. Second, for most large US companies, we can identify compensation data on the …rm's CEO. Third, environmental incidents, in aggregate, are economically signi…cant.
Our particular environmental dataset, CEPD, was compiled by the IRRC. We consider the magnitude of the total government …ne (i.e., the total …nes across all counts of environmental lawbreaking for an incident) as a proxy for the severity of harm.
Government …nes are typically only a fraction of the overall cost of an event. For a dramatic example, BP's Prudhoe Bay spill induced a $20 million government …ne for violating environmental laws. However, BP also had to pay $25 million in civil costs, $60 million for instituting a new government-mandated safety program, and some $500 million of construc-tion costs, bringing the …nal bill to at least $605 million. 5 Hence, for this particular case, the $20 million reported in our CEPD dataset represents roughly 3:3% of the total cost.
In total, the CEPD includes both large and small violations. The mean government …ne for our data is approximately $223,000. Based on the Prudhoe example above, this would amount to $6:8 million in total average expenses. 6 Only the largest of these failures would be considered an environmental disaster. However, smaller violations can indicate an increased chance of generating a larger and more harmful-a "tip of the iceberg" signal. If we only considered the most extreme events, there would be too few for identi…cation. Instead, in our analysis, in addition to considering any lawbreaking events, we also separately analyze small and large incidences.
We merge the CEPD dataset with COMPUSTAT and Execucomp data to identify …rm …nancials and CEO compensation. Firm …nancial controls include …rm leverage, de…ned as total debt to total assets, …rm market value, and Tobin's Q. For CEO compensation, we obtain the annual value of options and stock awards. These two values are then used to calculate the index P as identi…ed from our theory section in equation (??). Finally, as controls, we include a CEO's total annual compensation and the percent of total compensation paid in the form of equity compensation. Thus, we are estimating the relationship of the composition of equity compensation conditional on both the total level of compensation and the fraction of pay devoted to equity compensation.
Although we control for …rm invariant environmental factors through …rm …xed e¤ects, Summary statistics for our primary variables are reported in Table 1 . On average, …rms experience an event (i.e., a breach of at least one environmental law in a given year) about 15% of the time, or about every six years. Firms are also large-averaging over $11 billion in market capitalization. The average CEO receives about $6 million per annum in total compensation, and about 75% of equity compensation is in the form of options (i.e., index P ). We …nd that the correlation of total equity compensation and total compensation has a correlation of .96, which means most all of the variation in total compensation comes from the amount of equity compensation, which is the focus of our study.
Results: Environmental Events
Our primary regression model for analyzing incident rates is a panel logit model with …rm …xed e¤ects. Speci…cally, we use
where Event i equals 1 when …rm i has broken the law in year t.
where i is a …xed e¤ect for …rm i; and X it is a matrix of control variables that include year …xed e¤ects and …nancial and environmental performance controls outlined in the previous section. The regressor
is the index P from our theory model and is calculated as the ratio of the total value of CEO option awards to the total value of CEO option and stock awards at time t 1 for …rm i:
7 Hence, the coe¢ cient estimate b of is our primary estimate of interest. Hypothesis 2 predicts that > 0. Although estimating …xed e¤ects is possible in the panel logit setting, to do so, we must drop observations of …rms that never have an event or …rms that have an event ever year. Of the 1; 459 …rms in our sample, 3:2%
have an event every year and 74:5% never experience an event during our time series. By …rm, the mean number of events across the entire 11-year time series is 1.3. Conditional on a …rm having at least one event, the mean number of events is 3.5 across the 11 years.
In addition to this primary speci…cation, we estimate a linear panel model with …rm …xed e¤ects. Although this model must assume the probability of an event is linear in its terms, it allows us to consider those …rms that never or always have an event in our sample. We specify this model thus:
In our …rst prediction, we consider the relationship between P and incident rates. We then turn to our second prediction-the relationship between P and the magnitude of events.
Increased P Results in Increased Odds of an Event
We report our baseline speci…cation in Table 2 . Column (1) reports results controlling for unobserved …rm heterogeneity and total CEO compensation. The logit estimate of roughly 0:5 can be converted to an odds ratio format, 8 yielding e 0:5 = 1: 648 7: This means that if a CEO goes from receiving all equity compensation in stock (i.e., P = 0) to receiving all equity compensation in options (i.e., P = 1); her …rm will have 64:87% increased odds of facing an environmental incident the next year. Adding all of the other controls does little to change the relative magnitude and signi…cance of the coe¢ cient of interest, as shown in 7 Based on personal conversations with o¢ cials at the Environmental Protection Agency and a human resource consultantcy, it appears that with this t 1 speci…cation, a CEO typically knows her compensation structure 6-24 months before an event occurs in our CEP D data. 8 Recall that the odds of an event is calculated as
The odds ratio is the ratio of two odds.
columns (2)-(4) :
We next consider our linear panel model with …rm …xed e¤ects. Table 3 reports coe¢ cient estimates for this speci…cation. Note that the observations for column (1) are 5; 108 compared with 1; 750 for column (1) in Table 2 ; this is due to the inclusion of all …rms (i.e., adding those …rms that never and always face an event in a given year). As seen in column (1), coe¢ cient estimates suggest that the probability of an environmental incident increases by approximately 5%: Recall from Table 1 that the baseline chance of an event is 15%; which means that a CEO going from equity compensation structure P = 0 to P = 1 results in a 33% increased chance of an event. We can convert our linear model coe¢ cient estimate to odds in order to compare these estimates with our results found in Table 2 . In particular, a baseline probability of 15% means that the odds of an event are Thus far, we have been using …rm …xed e¤ects to control for unobserved …rm heterogeneity. Recent …nancial economic research suggests that not doing so can produce spurious results and incorrect inferences (see Gormley and Matsa (2014) ) . Nonetheless, if …xed e¤ects are not called for, we are, of course, using a less e¢ cient estimator, possibly failing to identify other important e¤ects. We run a Hausman test to determine if a linear random e¤ects panel model would be appropriate given that a linear …xed e¤ect panel model is correct. Since we are using clustered standard errors, it is important not to use the conventional Hausman test, which assumes i and e it are i:i:d:-but this is violated if clustered standard errors are appropriate for within-…rm serial correlation. Instead we turn to the method of Wooldridge (2002) to accommodate our setting. Results from this test report a Sargan-Hansen statistic of 113:50, which yields a p-value = 0:0000: Hence, we can strongly reject the e¢ cacy of using a random e¤ects model for our empirical setting.
To consider the importance of larger versus small events, we return to our logit …xed e¤ects panel model and recode events as either bottom-quartile or top-quartile magnitude events. Magnitude is again the total government …nes imposed for an incident. Table   4 reports these results. Column (1) contains the same speci…cation reported in column (4) of Table 2 , which contains all controls. Column (2) shows us that if we de…ne events as only those in the smallest quartile magnitude-wise, the point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The top quartile, however, has a coe¢ cient estimate on P that is roughly twice that if we include all events: 1:13 vs. 0:53: This estimate from column (3) suggests that a CEO's …rm with an index P = 1 will have almost triple the odds of breaking environmental law in the next year compared to a CEO's …rm with an index of P = 0.
We also conduct the same exercise with our linear …xed e¤ect model so that we can include all observations. Table 5 reports these results, which are similar to those in Table   4 : the top-quartile events are signi…cantly related to P; and the bottom ones are not. In sum, these …ndings suggest that in terms of incident rate, CEO compensation structure, as measured by P; is especially related to high-stakes events.
Robustness Tests
If CEO compensation in ‡uences environmental harm and disasters, it should not be the case that this year's odds of an event in ‡uence next year's compensation structure P: In order to this, we rerun the speci…cations in Table 2 with the modi…cation that we measure P the year after rather than the year before an event. As reported in Table 6 , none of the speci…cations are signi…cant.
Another natural question is to what extent compensation structure P is simply a proxy for other important compensation variables. First, it could be that the total option awards currently held by a CEO are what really matters in determining incident rates; last year's option award is simply a proxy for this larger value. Similarly, it could also be that the current total value of stock held by the CEO is what really determines incident rates and P somehow proxies for this. We explore these possibilities by rerunning the speci…cation from Table 4 in column (3) (i.e., the speci…cation with all of our controls) and then adding controls for a CEO's value of total stock and option awards currently held through the previous year, each logged. 9 We report these results in Table 7 . For comparison purposes, column (1) replicates the results from column (3) in Table 4 : our baseline regression with all controls.
Column (2) then adds lagged values for the log of total stocks and options owned by the CEO. Surprisingly, neither regressor can help predict the odds of an environmental event.
Meanwhile, the coe¢ cient P changes little in estimate or signi…cance when these additional controls are added.
Another potentially important measure of executive compensation is the CEO's Delta of her options portfolio. Some argue that Delta should increase risk-taking, whereas others argue that it should decrease risk-taking. This ambiguity arises both in the theory and empirical literature (see Coles et al. (2006) and cites therein). For this paper, Delta is the dollar change in CEO wealth as fa unction of a 1% change in stock price. We calculate the CEO's Delta for each executive in our sample using the same method as in Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) . The results of adding this measure of Delta as a regressor are reported in column (3) : The coe¢ cient on Delta is not statistically di¤erent from 0. 10 The coe¢ cient on the index P is now slightly greater and even more signi…cant at the 1% level.
A …nal common measure of the nature of equity compensation, is Vega. This measures how much of an increase in wealth a CEO receives with a 1% increase in her company's stock volatility. We calculate this measure as in Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) .
All things equal, this measure should be positively correlated with managerial risk-taking (see Coles et al. (2006) ). However, it should be positively correlated with managerial risktaking that increases the company's stock volatility. Column (4) reports that our coe¢ cient on Vega is positive but no di¤erent statistically from zero. This suggests that while Vega tends to do well in capturing traditional measures of risk-taking, it does not seem to capture increase risk of environmental harm. Meanwhile, the coe¢ cient on our compensation index P becomes greater in magnitude and signi…cance than when we do not control for Vega.
In total, it seems that our compensation index P is not simply a noisy proxy for measuring other important executive-compensation measures. In fact, for our setting of the risk of environmental harm, it seems to do a better job than the extant measures. In one sense this is not surprising, as an increased risk of environmental harm, especially the kind that results in spectacular disasters, could be considered more of an "o¤ balance sheet" risk. The conventional measures of managerial risk-taking-…rm leverage, reduced cash surplus, R&D investment, reduced capital purchases, and more-focused lines of business and acquisitionsare all forms of risk-taking easily observable by the …nancial market and thus embedded in a company's stock return and volatility. In contrast, managerial choices, such as shirking on oil-pipe inspections or choosing not to install automatic shuto¤ valves on oil platforms, are much more di¢ cult for the market to identify and price into a company's stock. Perhaps the index P can help on that dimension in predicting such risks.
Increased P Results in Increased magnitude of harm
For testing our second prediction, we use a similar speci…cation to our linear panel model in the previous section. However, we change our dependent variable from an event indicator to the log of total government …nes. We utilize the following model:
where f ine is the total government …ne assessed for the incident and all of the other regressors are as they were in equation (2) . Of course, since Prediction 2 is a conditional prediction, we now only have observations for those …rm-years that record an environmental incident.
Our main coe¢ cient of interest is again . Table 8 reports the results for similar speci…cations to those in Table 2 . The …rst three speci…cations yield a signi…cant coe¢ cient on P at the 5% level. The …nal speci…cation with all controls yields signi…cance at the 10% level. Since these are semi-elasticities, the coe¢ cient estimates suggest that, roughly speaking, a CEO going from P = 0 to P = 1;
conditional on experiencing an event, will witness greater total event costs of 84% to 100%:
Since we are using a linear panel FE model, we again need to ask if it is the appropriate model vis-a-vis a random e¤ects model. Conducting a Hausman test, as we did in our previous section, we …nd a Sargan-Hansen statistic of 39:948 p-value =0:0008; which causes us to strongly reject the null hypothesis that the random e¤ects model is appropriate given that the …xed e¤ects model is appropriate.
We again consider the comparison of the large and small events. Unfortunately, we now have a signi…cantly reduced sample size compared to the previous section; thus, we now simply partition …nes into below median and above median …nes. We use all of the controls used for the results in column (4) of Table 8 for Table 9 . For comparison purposes, column
(1) in Table 9 replicates the results in Column (4) of Table 8 . We …nd that using the sample of large (i.e., above median) …nes creates an estimate of the coe¢ cient on P signi…cant at the 5% level compared with a 10% signi…cance level when using the sample of all …nes. Further, the estimate using only larger …nes is over 50% greater in magnitude compared with the full sample that includes small …nes. Meanwhile, a sample of only small …nes does not yield a signi…cant estimate of the coe¢ cient on P .
We also rerun the speci…cation from column (4) in Table 8 with the addition of the natural log of total company stock, options, Delta, and Vega. Again, none of these control variables are signi…cant, and they do not materially change the results. Similarly, the current magnitude of an event does not predict next year's compensation structure P:
Selection vs. Incentives
Although it seems that higher P results in greater rates of and magnitudes of misconduct, it is not clear if this is because of selection or incentives. It could be that …rms that want to take on greater risk of harm, attract those CEOs more willing to do so by o¤ering a higher P (as opposed to the greater P incentivizing greater risk of harm). In an attempt to disentangle these two possibilities, we conduct the same exercise as in the last two subsections, but now at the CEO-…rm level. That is, we use a …xed e¤ect for each CEO-…rm pair, whereas before that …xed e¤ect was at the …rm level. Thus, we will only be able to identify any e¤ect of P on environmental law-breaking by the variation of P while a particular CEO is at one particular …rm. Although this approach will potentially remove signi…cant variation from the analysis, it allows us to better identify the incentive versus selection e¤ect. If there is no e¤ect of P at the CEO-…rm level, then we cannot rule out that the e¤ects of P come through selection as opposed to incentives.
In Table 10 , we report the results of both a logit and linear …xed e¤ects model for the CEO-…rm pair level. Now, the high-magnitude (i.e., top-quartile) events are signi…cant (at the 5% level). Thus, identi…cation is coming from the larger-stakes events, which parallels our earlier …ndings when analyzing the data at the …rm rather than CEO-…rm level. In terms of magnitude of e¤ect, the coe¢ cient estimates at the CEO-…rm level (when we include all events of all magnitudes) are about half of the magnitude of those at the …rm level. However, the top-quartile estimates are similar for both levels of analysis.
In terms of P 0 s e¤ect on the magnitude of an event, as reported in Table 11 , the values are similar. In terms of signi…cance, the CEO-…rm level has lower signi…cance for its estimates, which is not a surprise since we are now only identifying these di¤erences from pay variation of a particular CEO while at a single …rm. The …nal column with all controls has a p-value just short of 10%, whereas all of the other speci…cations carry p-values of less than 10%.
In sum, it seems that a substantial portion of the e¤ect identi…ed earlier at the …rm level is also occurring at the CEO-…rm level, at least for the high-magnitude events. This suggests that CEO compensation e¤ects on environmental law-breaking are occurring largely through incentive provision (and not simply selection).
Despite all of the above …ndings, it is possible the index P only predicts the incident rate and magnitude of events for environmental harm and not other settings. To further explore
this possibility, we now analyze the index P in a di¤erent setting and di¤erent time period:
…nancial accounting misconduct.
Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting Misconduct
Financial accounting represents another setting in which, similar to environmental harm, getting caught for breaking accounting law can be viewed as a failed strategy that had a greater downside. Firms can choose to be more aggressive in their accounting practices, magnifying their …rm's …nancial downside. In our setting, an event is an earnings restatement that results in an SEC investigation. This means that we are really measuring the likelihood of breaking the law; to the extent that being investigated by the SEC for suspicious …nancial accounting is correlated with greater risk-taking, we can conceptualize an SEC investigation as a signal of higher risk-taking.
The reason that we proceed with this section of analysis is many-layered. First, some studies have shown that options pay is related to accounting misconduct (e.g., see Burns some 362% increased odds of a …nancial accounting investigation. This coe¢ cient estimate on P is signi…cant at the 5% level in column (3) and at the 1% level in the other columns. Table 13 reports the same speci…cations as in Table 12 but for a linear panel model.
All speci…cations show the coe¢ cient estimates on P to be signi…cant at the 1% level and close to an average value of 0:4%; which amounts to an 80% increase in the likelihood of a …nancial accounting event. Since incident rates are less than 1%; the increase in odds, as indicated by the odds ratio, is similar to an increase in probability. Converting the 80% increase in chance to an odds ratio yields 1:81, which implies an 81% increased odds of an event. Thus, in contrast to our environmental law-breaking setting, the linear estimator and logit estimator imply sharply di¤erent increases in odds. When estimating low-probability events, the shape of the tail of the statistical distribution clearly matters.
As mentioned, a nice feature of studying this accounting data, in addition to having a larger sample, is that our time series passes through two signi…cant accounting policy
changes. We had the passage of both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and FAS 123R (2005).
The former act essentially created a larger expected penalty for CEOs involved in accounting misconduct. Our Hypothesis 5 predicts Sarbanes-Oxley will have no e¤ect on risk-taking in equilibrium and thus will not be associated with the incidence of restatements investigated by the SEC.
The FAS 123R policy change, in contrast, essentially made it more expensive for a …rm to award options. Hypothesis 6 predicts that a rule change like FAS123R should lower misconduct incident rates
We consider these two policy changes with a simple, non-parametric time speci…cation.
Speci…cally, we add an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for all years that the new policy is e¤ective, which begins in 2002 for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 2006 for FAS 123R.
To limit collinearity with our year …xed-e¤ects, we create year …xed-e¤ects from 2004 onward.
We report these results in However, we can more loosely de…ne our event as a negative earnings restatement, rather than one that also results in an SEC investigation. Doing so increases our observations to 283: In contrast to our environmental incident data, accounting restatements are quite rare even for …rms that experience one. In fact, for our 12-year sample, for …rms that face a restatement, 72:4% never experience an additional restatement. If we only consider negative earnings restatements, then 82:1% of …rms only experience one such event. Thus, when considering the conditional magnitude of an event, our sample is similar to a cross section. Consequently, we implement an OLS model to measure the relationship of …rm compensation and earnings restatement magnitude. We also add industry controls at the NAICS code two-digit level.
We do …nd a relationship between compensation structure P and the magnitude of negative earnings restatements. Table 15 reports these results. Since these are semi-elasticities, the magnitudes suggest that a CEO going from P = 0 to P = 1 will oversee a roughly 49%
to 65% increase in the magnitude of a negative earnings restatement, conditional on facing such a restatement.
Conclusion
We explored how executive compensation a¤ects adverse …rm outcomes. To do so we constructed an index of compensation called P; where increased P predicts a greater chance and magnitude of misconduct. We tested these predictions in the setting of breaking environmental and accounting law. We found that changing a CEO's compensation from 100% stock to 100% options (i.e., P = 0 to P = 1) resulted in a 60% increased odds of environmental harm and close to a doubling of the magnitude of harm. Similarly, for the same change in equity compensation, we found over 80% increased odds that the …rm has an accounting restatement that is investigated by the SEC. We also discovered that the magnitude of negative earnings restatements increased by over 50%: Finally, we found that the e¤ect of P seems to be coming from an incentive e¤ect and not simply a selection e¤ect.
As far as policy, our results suggest that increasing the regulatory stick against top management for failed risky-project outcomes does not change the incident rate nor the magnitude of loss. Intuitively, making the stick larger does not change the …rm's level of desired downside exposure: thus, the …rm simply changes P to still induce the same level of exposure as it had before the regulatory change. In contrast, making it more costly to provide a carrot (i.e., increasing the relative cost of providing options) can reduce a …rm's choice of potential harm. We found evidence that a rule change of adding a larger executive penalty-Sarbanes-Oxley-did not a¤ect incident rates, whereas a rule change making the higher powered incentives more costly to the …rm-FAS 123R-successfully reduced incident rates.
In terms of managerial implications, we have explored a potential unintended consequence of higher powered incentives, as captured by P : It is well established that high powered incentives can increase positive …rm outcomes, but it seems that they can also increase adverse outcomes. Thus, induced increased productivity must be weighed against potential harm 
Nonetheless
, not yet explored is how to match these di¤erent types of incentives; research that considers the right mix of …nancial and sustainability incentives could prove promising.
That is, exploring executive compensation more holistically-in terms of seeking pro…t, limiting misconduct, and enhancing sustainability-could provide important new insights. We
hope to see such a multi-dimensional approach in future research. Online Appendix
A Model of Executive Compensation and Misconduct
Our model is most similar in spirit to that of Edmans and Liu (2011) who assume that a …rm must incentivize its manager via debt and stock. Instead, we consider the two instruments to be stocks and options. In addition, whereas they explore contract type as a function of the nature of the …rm, we have the di¤erent task of linking compensation structure to the outcomes of failures, both in terms of frequency and magnitude. To ease exposition, we relegate proofs to the next section of the appendix.
In our setting, the CEO must choose between a riskier project R and a safer project S:
Let p be the probability project R ( S) succeeds with the …rm being worth V RS ( V SS ); and 1 p the chance it fails, providing a …rm value of V RF ( V SF ): We could have di¤erent p 0 s for each project type. Or we can simply rede…ne …rm value to make it equivalent to having the same p for both R and S: To simplify exposition, we choose the latter approach. We also assume V RF is a random variable whose realization is only observable by the CEO and is drawn from some commonly known uniform distribution G distributed with support [0;
If the the greatest downside project R is chosen (i.e., V RF = 0); failure means that the …rm is completely destroyed and becomes worth zero. Finally, it is assumed that any …rm-level penalty (e.g., regulatory …nes) for a failure is incorporated into the value V RF and V SF :
For some opportunities, it may be in the best interest of the …rm for the CEO to choose a project R over a safer project S. For instance, the principal of the …rm will want the CEO to choose R i¤ pV SS + (1 p)V SF pV RS + (1 p)V RF ; which is equivalent to
We denote the initial value of the …rm as V 0 and assume the ordering 0 V RF V SF < V 0 < V SS < V RS : Thus, the value of the …rm after a riskier success is the greatest, but a riskier failure leaves the …rm worth the least.
The following diagram summarizes the ending …rm value V ij ;with the project type i 2 fRisky; Safeg and outcome j 2 fSuccess; F ailureg
The CEO is paid in equity compensation consisting of some portion of options and some portion of stock. We normalize her salary to zero, since salary does not a¤ect project choices.
Payo¤s for the CEO for each possible state of the world are as follows.
For the case of compensating a CEO in stock, she then simply receives fraction of the …rm, as long as there is no riskier failure. The fraction measures the level of option compensation to the CEO. Typically executive option awards are issued close to "at the money," which, for our setting, means that options only have value after a successful project outcome. Thus, the CEO receives share of the …rm's increase in value, which happens only when a project-R or S-succeeds.
Regardless of compensation structure, in the event of a riskier failure, V RF is realized and the executive faces a penalty of
This can be thought of as lost future income or reputation for the CEO, as well as regulator …nes and possible incarceration. This penalty is also increasing in the magnitude of failure.
A CEO compensated solely by options will choose R when it has a positive expected payo¤ for him:
However, this will not be satis…ed for some riskier projects since we may have a realization as low as V RF = 0: A CEO who is compensated only via stocks will choose
Again, since we can have V RF = 0; the CEO will sometimes choose the safer project when paid all in stock.
For the CEO to choose the riskier project, it must be that the expected payo¤ from choosing R is greater than the safer one, which can be written as
The …rm, meanwhile, will choose some cuto¤ value V RF such that the CEO chooses all riskier projects R when e V RF V RF and chooses S otherwise, where e V RF is the realization of the random variable V RF . This means that with a realization of V RF ; the …rm is indi¤erent between the CEO choosing R and S; which happens when p (V RS V SS ) + (1 p) (V RF V SF ) = 0: the expected bene…t of choosing the riskier project equals the expected bene…t of choosing the safer one. This implies that
We refer to V RF as the risk-taking standard of the …rm. We assume that the primitives of the model take on values such that
+ V SF > 0 so that we can rule out the case where the riskier project is preferred by the …rm for any possible realization of V RF ; if this were true, riskier projects would always be chosen and there would be no project selection tension.
Finally, although riskier projects are not always preferred, they are still sometimes attractive. Formally, we assume that (V 0 V SF ) (V RS V SS ) : This inequality means that the additional gain from the success of a riskier project is at least as great in magnitude as the loss from an unsuccessful safer project.
With these preliminaries, we can present the timeline of our stylized model:
1. The …rm o¤ers the CEO an equity pay contract (i.e., stocks and options); if it has a higher expected net present value than the safer project S:
We next consider comparative statics to identify some testable empirical predictions. As shown in the next section, the relationship of the share of options o¤ered and a …rm's risk standard V RF is nonmonotonic. However, for high-stakes environments (i.e., those settings for which the …rm faces signi…cant losses in the event of a riskier failure or the CEO faces a large penalty for a riskier failure) we have the following …ndings:
Proposition 2 Assuming high-stakes; an increase in option share increases the chance q (1 p) of riskier failure and decreases the expected value of the …rm upon a riskier failure
Proof. See appendix Thus, as a greater level of options are o¤ered to the CEO, we expect the chance of a riskier failure to be greater and that such a failure will further reduce the value of the …rm.
To take our predictions to the data, we link the outcome variable in our theory to a simple, observable variable. We call this new outcome variable the index P and de…ne it thus:
which is the expected value of option awards divided by the expected value of option awards and stock awards. In other words, P is the fraction of the value of equity compensation that the CEO receives in the form of options, which is readily identi…ed in our data.
Our …nal proposition provides our empirical predictions linked to P :
Proposition 3 Assuming high-stakes; an increase in the index P results in 1. an increase in the odds of a riskier failure;
2. an increase in the expected cost of riskier failure
Proof. See appendix
Proofs
Lemma 1 CEOs receive options share =
Proof: The …rm's problem is written as
subject to
where we de…ne q Pr(V RF V RF ). We proceed by assuming, as in Edmans and Liu (2011) , that the …rm induces the CEO to choose the …rst-best policy (i.e., choose R if and only if its expected value is greater than S): This adds the constraint
The conditions + 1 and ; 0 ensure no more than the entire …rm is given away and that only positive shares are given away.
The proof proceeds by …rst assuming that the principal could directly choose V RF : Thus, conditional on V RF ; q is …xed and it can readily be shown that
which means that options are lower cost than stock as a form of executive compensation.
However, the principal cannot directly choose V RF but instead must induce the CEO to take on some risk standard V RF : This is achieved through choosing and such that we meet inequality (5) : Since it is costly for the …rm to provide and , this constraint will bind. At = = 0; clearly (5) is not met. At the extreme, if
will be chosen, as is less costly to the …rm than . This is the case where k is so great that the …rm cannot induce as much risk-taking as it would like and thus must settle for a higher V RF than desired. In this setting, it means that there is no relationship between changes in the primitives and (i.e., because = 1 regardless of parameter perturbations). Thus, to explore interior solutions we now focus on those cases where
Note that less than is required to meet the inequality (5). Hence, since inequality (6) also shows that is less costly than , the …rm will choose some > 0 and = 0: However, if we assume some 0; 1 this means that the payment is then
+ V SF ; with further rearranging, our expression for the 
The sign of
is non-monotonic in risk-taking. We will have
If = 0; then this condition simpli…es to
We refer to those settings where inequality (9) is met as the condition of high-stakes.
This inequality is met when the risk standard V RF is su¢ ciently low, which means that the expected value of a riskier failure is su¢ ciently adverse. In addition, it also occurs with su¢ ciently high penalty k to the CEO upon a riskier failure. If condition (9) is not met, then for this region of parameters, the comparative statics are simply reversed.
It is also the case that
This can be seen by noting that
This expression is negative when + k (V RF ) 2 < 0; which occurs under high-stakes. That
Now consider how lowering the risk standard
It is trivial that E[V RF jV RF > V RF ] decreases as V RF decreases: decreasing V RF lowers the lower bound of support of V RF while maintaining the same upper bound of support. It is not, however, trivial that q (1 p) increases as V RF decreases; an increase in p lowers the risk-standard V RF ; which means that q increases while (1 p) decreases. To determine the net e¤ect, note that d dp
We now combine these three comparative statics to conclude that if a …rm lowers its risk standard V RF ; option share increases, the chance q (1 p) of a riskier failure increases, and the expected value of the …rm upon a riskier failure E[V RF jV RF > V RF ] decreases.
QED
Proposition 3 Assuming riskier projects are high-stakes; an increase in the index P results in
1. an increase in the odds of a riskier failure;
2. an increase in the expected cost of a riskier failure
Proof: We must show that any change in P results in the same directional change in :
Then, using Proposition 2, along with noting that an increased chance of an event also means increased odds and noting that the cost of a riskier failure (i.e.,
is strictly decreasing in E[V RF jV RF > V RF ]; the proof is complete. The expected value of options compensation can be written as
The expected value of compensation in stock is written as
Now consider the index P; which we de…ne as
First note that holding all other variables …xed; P is increasing in since P < 
We see that excluding p; V SF and all of the parameters that create q all reduce the value of pV 0 + (1 q) (1 p) V SF as they also increase : Thus, we must …nally check that this term is (weakly) decreasing in p (since is increasing in p) :
where the …nal inequality follows from
2 If a parameter (e.g., V SF ) decreases ; then take t to be its inverse (i.e., 
